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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION 
OF ABORTION 
Michael R. Braudest 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Among the most divisive legal and social issues in contemporary 
American society is the existence of a woman's right to obtain an 
abortion, as counterbalanced by the authority of states and munici-
palities to regulate and restrict that right. Between 1973 and 1989, 
the basic rules concerning the power of the states to prohibit or 
significantly restrict the performance of abortions were those an-
nounced by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. I While the rules and 
analytic method adopted in Roe quickly became controversial, they 
nevertheless provided relatively clear guidance to women seeking 
abortions and to physicians willing to perform the procedure. Sixteen 
years after Roe, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,2 the 
Supreme Court, substantially altered by retirements and new appoint-
ments, served notice that the analytical basis of Roe is no longer 
acceptable to a majority of the Justices. It is a safe prediction that 
Roe will not long survive in its original form. 3 
The purpose of this Article is to explore in detail under the 
constitutions of the various states the regulation of abortion, a body 
of law that is already important and will become far more important 
if Roe is overruled or substantially modified. The Article begins with 
a description of the major developments in abortion-related issues 
decided by the Supreme Court during the period between Roe and 
Webster. The decisions of state courts recognizing some form of a 
t B.A., 1975, Johns Hopkins University; J.D., 1978, University of Chicago 
School of Law; Assistant Public Defender, Appellate Division, Office of the 
Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland. 
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
2. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
3. For an interesting discussion on the political backlash following the Webster 
decision, see L. TRIBE, ABORTION THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 177-97 (1990). 
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"right to abortion" under the states' constitutions are then examined. 
Many of these decisions have involved the question whether states 
should provide funding and facilities which permit economically dis-
advantaged women to obtain abortions. The discussion then focuses 
on another major battleground in the abortion controversy which has 
led to state constitutional adjudication: the collision between the 
right of anti-abortion demonstrators to publicly express their views 
and the right of abortion clinics to be free from interference by such 
demonstrators. The discussion concludes with an examination of 
Maryland's newly adopted statutory scheme regulating abortion. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
In Roe v. Wade, a pregnant woman brought a class action suit 
challenging the validity of Texas's criminal abortion law.4 That law 
prohibited the procurement of an abortion at any stage of pregnancy 
except for the purpose of saving the life of the potential mother. 5 
4. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1191-1194, 1196 (Vernon 1961). These statutes read 
as follows: 
Article 1191. Abortion. If any person shall designedly administer to 
a pregnant woman or knowingly procure to be administered with her 
consent any drug or medicine, or shall use towards her any violence 
or means whatever externally or internally applied, and thereby procure 
an abortion, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two 
nor more than five years; if it be done without her consent, the 
punishment shall be doubled. By "abortion" is meant that the life of 
the fetus or embryo shall be destroyed in the woman's womb or that 
a premature birth thereof be caused. 
Article 1192. Furnishing the means. Whoever furnishes the means 
for procuring an abortion knowing the purpose intended is guilty as 
an accomplice. 
Article 1193. Attempt at abortion. If the means used shall fail 
to produce an abortion, the offender is nevertheless guilty of an 
attempt to produce abortion, provided it be shown that such means 
were calculated to produce that result, and shall be fined not less 
than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars. 
Article 1194. Murder in producing abortion. If the death of the 
mother is occasioned by an abortion so produced or by an attempt 
to effect the same it is murder. 
Article 1196. By medical advice. Nothing in this chapter applies 
to an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the 
purpose of saving the life of the mother. 
See Roe, 410 U.S. at 118. 
5. There exists a tendency among persons with strong opinions concerning the 
morality of abortion to attach significance to the label used to denominate a 
woman considering an abortion. The so-called "pro-life" faction finds it 
offensive to refer to this individual as "the woman," while calling her "the 
mother" is at times viewed as offensive to the so-called "pro-choice" faction. 
The purpose of this Article is to explore the law without offering any moral 
judgment. In an effort to maintain neutrality, the appellation "potential 
mother" shall be used herein. 
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The Court held that this statute violated the plaintiff's right to due 
process of law. The Court's method of analysis was to identify three 
important conflicting interests, to balance those interests against each 
other, and to determine at what point during the course of a pregnancy 
each interest becomes paramount. 6 
Identifying in constitutional terms the interest of the potential 
mother, the Court found a "right of privacy" in the "Fourteenth 
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state 
action."7 Closely tied to the privacy right of the potential mother was 
the necessity that her physician be permitted the freedom to exercise 
his or her best medical judgment. The Court reasoned that proper 
medical judgment could under some circumstances take the form of 
aiding a potential mother in deciding whether to have an abortion. 
The Court also identified two important governmental interests 
which could corne into conflict with the potential mother's right to 
decide whether and when to undergo an abortion. First, the Court 
recognized an interest in safeguarding the potential mother's health 
which permits the state to enact regulations aimed at promoting health 
and maintaining appropriate medical standards. That interest does 
not, however, become constitutionally compelling until approximately 
the end of the first trimester of pregnancy. During the first trimester, 
the decision of potential mother and physician is immunized from 
governmental interference. 8 
Second, the Court recognized a governmental interest in the 
potentiality of human life. That interest was found to become com-
pelling at the point of viability-that is, when the fetus "has the 
6. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164, 165. 
7. Id. at 153. The Court found support for this right of privacy in a series of 
earlier cases dealing with contraception and other aspects of family life. See, 
e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (ban on distribution of contra-
ceptives to unmarried adults violative of guarantee of equal protection under 
the fourteenth amendment); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (statutory 
ban on interracial marriages invalid under the fourteenth amendment); Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (prohibition upon distribution of contra-
ceptives to adults violates constitutional right of privacy within the penumbra 
of the Bill of Rights); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parents' 
liberty interest in raising their children requires invalidation of requirement 
that children be sent to public as opposed to private schools under the 
fourteenth amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (prohibition 
of teaching any language -other than English to any child under the eighth 
grade violates the fourteenth amendment). 
8. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. In a subsequent case, the Court wrote: "Frequently, 
the first trimester is estimated as 12 weeks following conception, or 14 weeks 
following the last menstrual period." Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 431 n.15 (1983). In the same footnote, the Akron 
Court retained the conclusion of its predecessors in Roe that a trimester is not 
a precisely measurable period of time. 
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capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb."9 That point 
is generally reached between twenty-four and twenty-eight weeks into 
a pregnancy. 10 At this stage, the state is free to heavily regulate 
abortions, including prohibiting the procedure altogether unless it is 
necessary to preserve the life of the potential mother. 
During the remainder of the 1970s, the Court did not retreat 
from Roe in any substantial fashion. In fact, the Court often struck 
down attempts by state legislatures to place significant impediments 
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. While the Court 
recognized that it had not established an absolute right to abortion, 
and that the states retained the freedom to regulate the procedure so 
long as those regulations were not unduly burdensome, II the Justices 
regularly struck down state laws which ran afoul of the basic Roe 
framework. 
For example, in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Danforth,12 the Court expressly reaffirmed Roe's viability analysis, 
struck down an absolute requirement of spousal or parental consent, 
and invalidated a prohibition upon, a commonly used technique for 
performing abortions. At the same time, the Court in Danforth upheld 
statutory requirements that a physician obtain written consent from 
the potential mother before performing the procedure and that he 
maintain certain records. The Court found that these measures were 
genuinely health related and did not interfere with the opportunity 
for physician and patient to consult and reach a decision. 
Similarly, in Bellotti v. Baird,13 the Court held that a state may 
impose a parental or judicial consent requirement on an immature 
minor seeking an abortion, but only if the minor is granted an 
opportunity to establish that she is sufficiently mature to make the 
decision herself. In Colautti v. Franklin,t4 the Court reaffirmed Roe's 
viability criterion and its emphasis on the independent role of the 
physician, holding, inter alia, that certain restrictions on the physi-
cian's options when a fetus "may" be viable were void for vagueness. 
In 1980, the Supreme Court dealt a substantial, if indirect, setback 
to the qualified "right to abortion" it had announced in Roe. In 
9. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
10. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 457 
& n.5 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Hendricks, The Limits of 
Life, JOHNS HOPKINS MAG., Oct. 1989, at 16 (noting that while a fetus twenty-
two or fewer weeks old cannot survive because of insufficient lung capacity, 
survival rates at major hospitals are increasing in the twenty-four to twenty-
six week range). 
11. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977) (holding that medicaid benefits 
may constitutionally be withheld for elective, non therapeutic abortions). 
12. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
13. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
14. 439 U.S. 379 (1979). 
1990] State Regulation of Abortion 501 
Harris v. McRae ls and its companion case, Williams v. ZbaraZ,16 the 
Court considered the constitutional validity of the Hyde Amendment l7 
and similar state legislation. Under the Hyde Amendment, the federal 
government would no longer provide reimbursement to the states 
through the medicaid program for subsidization of medically necessary 
abortions. While the medicaid program would continue to subsidize 
the great majority of medically necessary procedures, nearly all abor-
tions-including some that were medically necessary-would be ex-
cluded from coverage. IS 
Two issues were before the Court in Harris. The first was 
statutory, and focused on whether the states were required to continue 
funding abortions under the medicaid program even after federal 
reimbursement had been removed. The Court examined the relevant 
legislative history, and concluded that the purpose of the medicaid 
program was to reduce the burden on the states through federal 
assistance. The Court found that Congress had never intended for 
the states to be forced to accept unilateral funding responsibility. 
Rather, it was intended that the states would administer the disburse-
ment of federal funds. Therefore, the cutoff of federal funding 
effectively removed the medicaid subsidy for abortions in its entirety. 19 
Having so concluded, the Court found that the constitutional 
issue was squarely presented. The petitioners asserted four separate 
arguments: (1) that the Hyde Amendment violated the substantive 
due process right recognized in Roe by reducing a potential mother's 
right to terminate her pregnancy, (2) that the legislation violated the 
establishment of religion clause of the first amendment, (3) that it 
15. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
16. 448 U.S. 358 (1980). 
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976). 
18. The Harris Court described the Hyde Amendment as follows: 
Since September 1976, Congress has prohibited either by an amend-
ment to the annual appropriations bill for the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare or by a joint resolution-the use of any 
federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid 
program except under certain specified circumstances. This funding 
restriction is commonly known as the "Hyde Amendment," after its 
original congressional sponsor, Representative Hyde. The current ver-
sion of the Hyde Amendment, applicable for the fiscal year 1980, 
provides: 
"[N]one of the funds provided by this joint resolution shall be 
used to perform abortions except where the life of the mother would 
be endangered if the fetus were carried to term; or except for such 
medical procedures necessary for the victims of rape or incest when 
such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law enforcement 
agency or public health service." 
Harris, 448 U.S. at 302. 
19. [d. at 309-11. 
502 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 19 
interfered with the free exercise of religion, and (4) that its discrim-
ination between medically necessary abortions and other necessary 
medical procedures violated the guarantee of equal protection.20 
The Court turned first to the heart of the matter-that is, whether 
the Hyde Amendment was at odds with the liberty interest recognized 
in Roe. Holding that it was not, the majority borrowed heavily from 
the reasoning of Maher v. Roe,21 where the Court had rejected the 
less compelling contention that medicaid funding was constitutionally 
required for purely elective, medically unnecessary abortions. The 
majority in Harris reasoned that a state is perfectly free to make a 
value judgment favoring childbirth over abortions and to implement 
that judgment through its allocation of funds. Similarly, the Court 
noted that if the Hyde Amendment left intact an impediment to the 
availability of abortions, that impediment was poverty-a condition 
which the state has not caused.22 
Finding that Roe imposed no affirmative obligation on the states 
to assist in the obtaining of an abortion but only a negative obligation 
to refrain from unnecessary interference, the majority in Harris found 
the existence of medical necessity for an abortion constitutionally 
irrelevant. In effect, it reasoned that government has no obligation 
to eliminate all of the consequences of indigency, but instead may 
constitutionally make social policy by concentrating its resources in 
areas that it finds most deserving, so long as it does not erect obstacles 
to the exercise of fundamental rights. Since the Hyde Amendment 
20. [d. at 311. 
21. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
22. The Court adopted the following language from Maher: 
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind from the 
laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions. The Connecticut 
regulation places no obstacles-absolute or otherwise-in the pregnant 
woman's path to an abortion. An indigent woman who desires an 
abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's 
decision to fund childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent 
on private sources for the service she desires. The State may have 
made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the 
woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to 
abortions that was not already there. The indigency that may make 
it difficult-and in some cases, perhaps, impossible-for some women 
to have abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by the 
Connecticut regulation. 
Harris, 448 U.S. at 314 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474). The Harris Court 
went on to add: "The Hyde Amendment, like the Connecticut welfare regu-
lation at issue in Maher, places no governmental obstacle in the path of a 
woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but rather, by means of 
unequal subsidization of abortion and other medical services, encourages al-
ternative activity deemed in the public interest." Harris, 448 U.S. at 315. 
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had erected no obstacle that was not already present, it did not violate 
the due process right announced in Roe.23 
The Court then proceeded to briefly analyze, and reject, the 
remaining constitutional challenges. With respect to the establishment 
clause, the majority concluded that the Hyde Amendment merely 
coincided with the views of certain religions; it did not actively favor 
one religion over another. The free exercise contention was rejected 
because the plaintiffs lacked standing to raise it.24 
Somewhat greater attention was devoted to the equal protection 
assertion. The Court reiterated that no substantive right had been 
infringed because financial need does not alone define a suspect class. 
Therefore, the distinction between abortion and other medical pro-
cedures need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
objective. That objective was ironically found in the text of Roe, 
where the Court had recognized the legitimacy of the state's interest 
in the potentiality of human life.2s 
The holding in Harris commanded a majority of five Justices. 
Each of the four dissenting Justices filed a separate opinion, which 
later proved to be influential when state courts considered similar 
issues under their own constitutions. Justice Brennan concluded that 
the challenged legislation was inconsistent with the right of choice 
protected by Roe.26 Justice Marshall was particularly concerned with 
the risk to life and health that dangerous pregnancies could impose 
on women unable to afford an abortionY 
23. [d. at 316-18. 
24. [d. at 320-21. 
25. [d. at 324-25. 
26. Justice Brennan wrote in part: 
The Hyde Amendment's denial of public funds for medically necessary 
abortions plainly intrudes upon this constitutionally protected decision, 
for both by design and in effect it serves to coerce indigent pregnant 
women to bear children that they would otherwise elect not to have. 
When viewed in the context of the Medicaid program to which 
it is appended, it is obvious that the Hyde Amendment is nothing less 
,than an attempt by Congress to circumvent the dictates of the Con-
stitution and achieve indirectly what Roe v. Wade said it could not 
do directly. 
[d. at 330-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
27. Justice Marshall wrote in part: 
Numerous conditions-such as cancer, rheumatic fever, diabetes, mal-
nutrition, phlebitis, sickle cell anemia, and heart disease-substantially 
increase the risks associated with pregnancy or are themselves aggra-
vated by pregnancy. Such conditions may make an abortion medically 
necessary in the judgment of a physician, but cannot be funded under 
the Hyde Amendment. Further, the health risks of undergoing an 
abortion increase dramatically as pregnancy becomes more advanced. 
By the time a pregnancy has progressed to the point where a physician 
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Justice Blackmun joined the other dissenting opinions, writing 
only to express his outrage at what he perceived to be the majority's 
callousness to the poor. 28 Justice Stevens, stressing Roe's holding that 
the right to abortion is always protected when the life or health of 
the potential mother is endangered, concluded that Congress had 
abandoned the neutral principle of medical need and was simply 
punishing women who needed abortions but could not afford them. 
Justice Stevens would have struck down the Hyde Amendment, and 
the similar state statute at issue in Zbaraz, as "an unjustifiable, and 
indeed blatant violation of the sovereign's duty to govern impar-
tially. "29 
Three years after the decisions in Harris and Zbaraz, the Court, 
by a vote of six to three, resoundingly reaffirmed the principles 
announced ten years earlier in Roe. In Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, Inc., 30 the issue presented was the validity of 
five provisions of an ordinance enacted by the city of Akron, Ohio. 
The ordinance in question provided the following: (1) that all abor-
tions after the first trimester were to be performed in a hospital, 
rather than in an outpatient clinic; (2) that parental consent was to 
be obtained prior to the performance of an abortion upon an un-
married minor; (3) that before consent to an abortion will be deemed 
"informed," a physician was required to recite a lengthy litany of 
information designed to inform the potential mother that a fetus is 
very close to being a human being and that an abortion is a dangerous 
procedure; (4) that a twenty-four hour waiting period was required 
between consent to an abortion and performance of the procedure; 
and (5) that an aborted fetus had to be disposed of in a "humane 
and sanitary" manner. 31 
Prior to analyzing the ordinance before it, the Court deemed its 
first order of business to be a forceful reaffirmation of the correctness 
and continuing validity of Roe's reasoningY The Court proceeded by 
is able to certify that it endangers the life of the mother, it is in many 
cases too late to prevent her death because abortion is no longer safe. 
There are also instances in which a woman's life will not be imme-
diately threatened by carrying the pregnancy to term, but aggravation 
of another medical condition will significantly shorten her life expec-
tancy. These cases as well are not fundable under the Hyde Amend-
ment. 
[d. at 339-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
28. [d. at 348-49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
29. [d. at 356-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
30. 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
31. [d. at 422-24. 
32. The Akron Court posited: 
[T]he doctrine of stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive 
on a constitutional question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a 
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applying the Roe holding to the Akron ordinance and found all five 
of the challenged provisions to be invalid. With respect to the re-
quirement that second trimester abortions be performed in a hospital, 
the Court acknowledged the state's interest in the health of the 
potential mother, but concluded that the requirement imposed sub-
stantial and unnecessary obstacles to obtaining an abortion. 
The key obstacle noted by the Court was that of cost-an 
abortion performed in a hospital cost $850 to $900, while an outpatient 
clinic offered the same service for $350 to $400 in the same geographic 
region. The Court also relied on evidence of the increasing safety of 
abortions performed in clinics and the scarcity of Akron hospitals 
willing to perform the procedure after the first trimester. The Court 
thus concluded that the ordinance impermissibly curtailed the right 
recognized in Roe.33 
The Court next turned to the requirement that a patient under 
the age of fifteen provide a written waiver signed by a parent. Citing 
Danforth and Bel/otti, the majority concluded that Akron's regulation 
was invalid because it made no exception for the possibility that the 
female minor would be sufficiently mature to make the decision for 
herself. 34 Next the Court struck down the required informed consent 
litany.JS The majority reasoned that such a requirement intruded on 
society governed by the rule of law. 
There are especially compelling reasons for adhering to stare 
decisis in applying the principles of Roe v. Wade. That case was 
considered with special care. It was first argued during the 1971 Term, 
and reargued-with extensive briefing-the following Term. The de-
cision was joined by The Chief Justice and six other Justices. Since 
Roe was decided in January 1973, the Court repeatedly and consis-
tently has accepted and applied the basic principle that a woman has 
a fundamental right to make the highly personal choice whether or 
not to terminate her pregnancy. 
[d. at 419-20, 420 n.l (citations omitted). 
33. [d. at 434-39. 
34. [d. at 439-42. 
35. That litany read as follows: 
(1) That according to the best judgment of her attending physician 
she is pregnant. 
(2) The number of weeks elapsed from the probable time of the 
conception of her unborn child, based upon the information provided 
by her as to the time of her last menstrual period or after a history 
and physical examination and appropriate laboratory tests. 
(3) That the unborn child is a human life from the moment of 
conception and that there has been described in detail the anatomical 
and physiological characteristics of the particular unborn child at the 
gestational point of development at which time the abortion is to be 
performed, including, but not limited to, appearance, mobility, tactile 
sensitivity, including pain, perception or response, brain and heart 
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the function of the physician and was designed to influence the 
potential mother to withhold her consent. The Court added that while 
it is perfectly legitimate for a state to assure that the woman be 
apprised of the risks of pregnancy and the abortion technique to be 
used, there is no justification for requiring that the physician who 
will perform the procedure (as opposed to some other individual) be 
the person who provides the information.36 
The requirement of a twenty-four hour waiting period between 
consent and performance of the procedure met a similar fate. The 
Court perceived no medical benefit reSUlting from this mandate. It 
emphasized the costs of two separate hospital admissions and the 
possibility that facilities for the operation would be unavailable at 
the end of the waiting period.3' Finally, the Court summarily invali-
dated the "humane disposal" of the fetus requirement, holding that 
the concept of "humane" is impermissibly vague where a criminal 
conviction is the result of a violation. 38 
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices White and Rehnquist, dis-
sented. The dissenters disagreed with the majority on every aspect of 
its analysis of the Akron ordinance, and would have found each of 
the five provisions to be valid. Of greater importance, the dissent 
function, the presence of internal organs and the presence of external 
members. 
(4) That her unborn child may be viable, and thus capable of 
surviving outside of her womb, if more than twenty-two (22) weeks 
have elapsed from the time of conception, and that her attending 
physician has a legal obligation to take all reasonable steps to preserve 
the life and health of her viable unborn child during the abortion. 
(5) That abortion is a major surgical procedure which can result 
in serious complications, including hemorrhage, perforated uterus, 
infection, menstrual disturbances, sterility and miscarriage and pre-
maturity in subsequent pregnancies; and that abortion may leave 
essentially unaffected or may worsen any existing psychological prob-
lems she may have, and can result in severe emotional disturbances. 
(6) That numerous public and private agencies and services are 
available to provide her with birth control information, and that her 
physician will provide her with a list of such agencies and the services 
available if she so requests. 
(7) That numerous public and private agencies and services are 
available to assist her during pregnancy and after the birth of her 
child, if she chooses not to have the abortion, whether she wishes to 
keep her child or place him or her for adoption, and that her physician 
will provide her with a list of such agencies and the services available 
if she so requests. 
[d. at 423 n.S. 
36. [d. at 448-49. 
37. [d. at 450. 
38. [d. at 451. 
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attacked Roe head-on, arguing that the entire concept of dividing a 
pregnancy into stages is unsound both as a matter of scientific reality 
and as a matter of sound constitutional adjudication. With respect 
to Roe's legal analysis, Justice O'Connor agreed that the state has a 
compelling interest in the potentiality of human life and in safeguard-
ing maternal health. She differed from the Roe majority, however, 
in her view that those "interests are present throughout pregnancy. "39 
Thus, the dissenters disagreed with the notion that abortions are 
constitutionally more acceptable during the first trimester than later 
in pregnancy. In their view, "potential life is no less potential in the 
first weeks of pregnancy than it is at viability or afterward. At any 
stage in pregnancy, there is the potential for human life."40In 
addition, the dissenters in Akron, citing recent medical studies, argued 
strenuously that advances in medical technology had eroded the 
scientific underpinnings of the Roe analysis.41 
39. Id. at 459 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
40. Id. at 461 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
41. Justice O'Connor wrote in part: 
The Roe framework, then, is clearly on a collision course with itself. 
As the medical risks of various abortion procedures decrease, the 
point at which the State may regulate for reasons of maternal health 
is moved further forward to actual childbirth. As medical science 
becomes better able to provide for the separate existence of the fetus, 
the point of viability is moved further back toward conception. 
Moreover, it is clear that the trimester approach violates the funda-
mental aspiration of judicial decisionmaking through the application 
of neutral principles "sufficiently absolute to give them roots through-
out the community and continuity over significant periods of time .... " 
The Roe framework is inherently tied to the state of medical tech-
nology that exists whenever particular litigation ensues. Although 
legislatures are better suited to make the necessary factual judgments 
in this area, the Court's framework forces legislatures, as a matter of 
constitutional law, to speculate about what constitutes "accepted 
medical practice" at any given time. Without the necessary expertise 
or ability, courts must then pretend to act as science review boards 
and examine those legislative judgments. 
The Court adheres to the Roe framework because the doctrine 
of stare decisis "demands respect in a society governed by the rule 
of law." Although respect for stare decisis cannot be challenged, "this 
Court's considered practice [is] not to apply stare decisis as rigidly in 
constitutional as in nonconstitutional cases." Although we must be 
mindful of the "desirability of continuity of decision in constitutional 
questions ... when convinced of former error, this Court has never 
felt constrained to follow precedent. In constitutional questions, where 
correction depends upon amendment and not upon legislative action 
this Court throughout its history has freely exercised its power to 
reexamine the basis of its constitutional decisions." 
Even assuming that there is a fundamental right to terminate 
pregnancy in some situations, there is no justification in law or logic 
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The Akron dissenters ultimately obtained much of what they 
wanted in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.42 By the time of 
the Webster decision, Justices Kennedy and Scalia had replaced Chief 
Justice Burger and Justice Powell-two members of the Roe and 
Akron majorities. This change on the Court led to a combination of 
viewpoints in Webster which suggests that Roe may not long survive. 
Challenged in Webster was the constitutional validity of four 
provisions of a Missouri statute43 which was anti-abortion in tone and 
content. The statute provided the following: (1) a preamble announc-
ing that life begins at conception and that unborn children have a 
protectable interest in life, health, and well-being; (2) a prohibition 
on the use of public funds and facilities for the performance of 
abortions; (3) a prohibition on public funding for the counselling and 
encouragement of abortions; and (4) a requirement that a physician 
perform a test for viability before performing an abortion, if the 
pregnancy is twenty or more weeks along.44 
The alignment of views in Webster is complex, and an overview 
will be helpful before providing detailed analysis. Chief Justice Rehn-
quist wrote the majority opinion of the Court and addressed all of 
the issues. Joined by Justices White, Scalia, O'Connor, and Kennedy, 
the Chief Justice found no constitutional flaw in the preamble or the 
prohibition on public funding or facilities for abortions. Joined by 
the entire Court, he found the challenge to the "encouraging or 
counselling" of abortions to be moot. Joined by Justices White and 
Kennedy to form a plurality, the Chief Justice upheld the viability 
testing provision as he believed it must be construed, and used the 
analysis of that issue as the basis for a thorough attack on Roe, 
which fell short of a vote to overrule only because Roe was found 
to be factually distinguishable. Justice O'Connor concurred, disagree-
ing only with the decision to discuss Roe at all. Justice Scalia believed 
that the Court should overrule Roe outright. Justices Blackmun, 
Marshall, Brennan and Stevens were of the view that Roe should 
remain intact. 
In Justice Rehnquist's majority-plurality opinion, the initial ques-
tion presented was the validity of the preamble to the Missouri statute. 
The Court found that the preamble simply expressed a value judgment, 
for the trimester framework adopted in Roe and employed by the 
Court today on the basis of stare decisis. For the reasons stated above, 
that framework is clearly an unworkable means of balancing the 
fundamental right and the compelling state interests that are indis-
putably implicated. 
Id. at 458-59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
42. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
43. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 1.205, 188.029, 188.210, 188.215 (Vernon Supp. 1990). 
44. Webster, 492 U.S. at 501. 
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and did not have any operative effect. The majority concluded that 
unless and until Missouri somehow gave effect to the challenged 
clauses, there was nothing for the Court to review. 45 
The majority's analysis of the statutory prohibition on the use 
of public facilities or employees in the performance of abortions 
parallelled the Court's reasoning in Harris. Citing Harris, Maher, and 
Poelker v. Doe,4fJ the Court held that this prohibition erected no 
obstacle to the performance of abortions that would not have been 
present had the state declined to provide any public health services. 
Since the state has no affirmative obligation to provide for abortions 
even during the first trimester and only a negative obligation to 
refrain from undue interference, the Court found no constitutional 
problem present.47 
It was in the course of analyzing the requirement that a physician 
test for viability before performing an abortion that the Chief Justice-
now expressing the views of a plurality (Justices Scalia and O'Connor 
expressed their own views on this point)-took aim at Roe. The 
plurality reasoned that any doubt cast on the validity of the statute 
was not caused by a flaw in the statute, but rather by the flawed 
reasoning of Roe.48 That flaw was found to be inherent in the trimester 
viability approach, which effectively promulgated a complex body of 
regulations foreign to the appropriate province of a court. Instead, 
the plurality maintained, the proper role of the Supreme Court is to 
formulate and apply general rules; detailed regulations are the province 
of legislatures. 
Echoing Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Akron, the 
Chief Justice went on to question the Roe holding that the state's 
interest in the potentiality of life becomes compelling at the point of 
viability. Chief Justice Rehnquist saw no reason why that interest, 
like the governmental interest in maternal health, should not become 
compelling from the moment of conception. 
The plurality's actual holding was that Missouri's requirement of 
viability testing furthered the state's interest in the potentiality of life, 
a conclusion which was not directly at odds with Roe. Since Roe had 
struck down a statute absolutely prohibiting abortions prior to via-
bility, the plurality found Roe distinguishable and saw no necessity 
to overrule it.49 Instead, the Webster decision only required the Court 
to modify and narrow Roe. 
The separate opinions of the remaining Justices are remarkable 
for their apparent bitterness and personal attack-the Justices accused 
45. [d. at 506-07. 
46. 432 U.S. 519 (1977). 
47. Webster, 492 U.S. at 407-11. 
48. [d. at 517. 
49. [d. at 521. 
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each other of cowardice, deception, and gross misunderstanding of 
the fundamentals of American government. While Justice O'Connor 
limited her remarks to an unremarkable analysis of the Court's 
tradition of self-restraint and its preference for not unnecessarily 
breaking new constitutional ground, Justice Scalia went much further. 
Writing that Justice O'Connor's call for restraint "cannot be 
taken seriously, "50 Justice Scalia argued vigorously for the explicit 
overruling of Roe. His contentiQn was fundamentally an institutional 
one. Abortion, Justice Scalia reasoned, is a political issue. Specific 
regulations should be formulated by elected officials, not life-tenured 
judges who are, or should be, beyond the political process. He called 
for Roe to be overruled swiftly, and implied that aborted fetuses are 
in the unique position of never having a day in court or an opportunity 
to convince judges to change the law. He further argued that a better 
opportunity to dispatch Roe might never come along, as no state 
could be expected to enact the sort of legislation that would squarely 
contravene the Roe holding.51 
The dissenters were equally firm in their view that Roe, which 
should have been reaffirmed, was instead in desperate trouble because 
the majority, without justification, had misconstrued the Missouri 
statute to create an unnecessary constitutional controversy. In resolv-
ing that constitutional controversy, the dissenters believed, the ma-
jority had ignored fundamental principles recognized sixteen years 
earlier in Roe. 52 Justice Stevens joined Justice Blackmun's dissenting 
50. [d. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
51. [d. at 535-37 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
52. Justice Blackmun wrote in pertinent part: 
Today, Roe v. Wade, and the fundamental constitutional right of 
women to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, survive but are 
not secure. Although the Court extricates itself from this case without 
making a single, even incremental, change in the law of abortion, the 
plurality and Justice Scalia would overrule Roe (the first silently, the 
other explicitly) and would return to the States virtually unfettered 
authority to control the quintessentially intimate, personal, and Iife-
directing decision whether to carry a fetus to term. Although today, 
no less than yesterday, the Constitution and the decisions of this 
Court prohibit a State from enacting laws that inhibit women from 
the meaningful exercise of that right, a plurality of this Court" implicitly 
invites every state legislature to enact more and more restrictive 
abortion regulations in order to provoke more and more test cases, 
in the hope that sometime down the line the Court will return the 
law of procreative freedom to the severe limitations that generally 
prevailed in this country before January 22, 1973. Never in my memory 
has a plurality announced a judgment of this Court that so foments 
disregard for the law and for our standing decisions. 
Nor in my memory has a plurality gone about its business in 
such a deceptive fashion. At every level of its review, from its effort 
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OpInIOn and added his belief that the Missouri statute invaded the 
sphere of personal privacy in the area of contraception, which had 
been safeguarded by Griswold v. Connecticut53 and its progeny.54 
III. THE "RIGHT TO ABORTION" UNDER THE STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 
A. A Response to the Supreme Court's Funding Decisions 
Webster indicates that Roe may soon be overruled or substantially 
modified. If the regulation of abortion is returned to the states, state 
constitutions and constitutional jurisprudence will play a crucial role 
in what will undoubtedly be a continuing controversy. 
Immediately after the Roe decision, there was little need for state 
courts to struggle with the existence, source, and contours of a 
"constitutional right to abortion." That state of affairs came to an 
abrupt end, however, when the Supreme Court ruled that government 
funding for virtually all abortions could constitutionally be curtailed. 
The holding in Harris v. McRae that medicaid funding for the 
poor need not even include medically necessary abortions spurred 
some state courts to find within their own constitutions a protected 
interest in obtaining an abortion, and to construe rights under state 
law as broad enough to compel the government to fund at least 
medically necessary abortions. Some state courts and individual judges 
went so far as to express the view that even elective abortions must 
to read the real meaning out of the Missouri statute, to its intended 
evisceration of precedents and its deafening silence about the consti-
tutional protections that it would jettison, the plurality obscures the 
portent of its analysis. With feigned restraint, the plurality announces 
that its analysis leaves Roe "undisturbed," albeit "modif[ied] and 
narrow[ed]." But this disclaimer is totally meaningless. The plurality 
opinion is filled with winks, and nods, and knowing glances to those 
who would do away with Roe explicitly, but turns a stone face to 
anyone in search of what the plurality conceives as the scope of a 
woman's right under the Due Process Clause to terminate a pregnancy 
free from the coercive and brooding influence of the State. The simple 
truth is that Roe would not survive the plurality's analysis, and that 
the plurality provides no substitute for Roe's protective umbrella. 
I fear for the future. I fear for the liberty and equality of the 
millions of women who have lived and come of age in the 16 years 
since Roe was decided. I fear for the integrity of, and public esteem 
for, this Court. '\ 
I dissent. 
Id. at 537-38 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
53. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
54. Webster, 492 U.S. at 564-66. 
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be funded if the government is going to provide medical care for the 
indigent in other areas. 
Typical of the range of views on this issue are the three opinions 
filed in Right to Choose v. Byrne.55 At issue there was the validity 
under the New Jersey Constitution of a statute which prohibited 
medicaid funding of abortions unless it was necessary to save the life 
of the potential mother. The statute, like the most restrictive version 
of the Hyde Amendment, barred funding even for medically necessary 
abortions if the potential mother's life was not at stake. A lower 
court had invalidated the statute under both the state and federal 
constitutions. 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the statute violated 
the right of pregnant women to equal protection under the New Jersey 
Constitution56 insofar as it denied funding for medically necessary 
abortions. The court began its analysis by noting the independence 
of state courts from the holdings of the Supreme Court where rights 
protected by state constitutions are involved, particularly where the 
state is one of the original thirteen and its constitution predated the 
federal constitution.57 
Reaching the merits, the court in Byrne analyzed the issue by 
first applying the traditional equal protection framework developed 
by the United States Supreme Court, and then applying the somewhat 
different rules previously applied in the construction of the New 
Jersey Constitution. In its traditional equal protection analysis, the 
court first concluded that it was dealing with a right to procreational 
choice that was fundamental under both state and federal law. 58 
55. 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982). 
56. "All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and 
unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and 
liberty, of acquiring, possessing, ?ond protecting property, and of pursuing and 
obtaining safety and happiness." N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
57. Byrne, 91 N.J. at 299, 450 A.2d at 931. On this point, the court in Byrne 
wrote: "Indeed, the United States Supreme Court itself has long proclaimed 
that state Constitutions may provide more expansive protection of individual 
liberties than the United States Constitution. In addition, this Court has 
recognized that our state Constitution may provide greater protection than the 
federal Constitution." [d. at 300, 450 A.2d at 932 (citations omitted). 
58. The court in Byrne stated the following: 
The right of privacy has been found to extend to a variety of areas, 
including sexual conduct between consenting adults; the right to 
sterilization; and even the right to terminate life itself. These cases 
establish that "under some circumstances, an individual's personal 
right to control her own body and life overrides the State's general 
interest in preserving life." 
In recent years, moreover, a body of law has developed in New 
Jersey acknowledging a woman's right to choose whether to carry a 
pregnancy to full-term or to undergo an abortion. Even before Roe 
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Explicitly recognizing that "[t]he right to choose whether to have 
an abortion . . . is a fundamental right· of all pregnant women, "59 
the court in Byrne proceeded to weigh that right against the asserted 
state interest of preserving potential life. Citing Roe and Justice 
Marshall's dissent in Harris, the court rejected the views of the Harris 
majority, and found that the state's interest was insufficient to uphold 
the statute in question.60 
The court then went on to hold that the legislation also ran afoul 
of New Jersey's equal protection analysis. Under that test, when an 
"important personal right" is implicated, the state must establish a 
greater "public need" than the federal cases require. Applying this 
test, the court found the state's asserted interest was inadequate where 
the health of the potential mother was at risk. 
The majority refused, however, to extend this reasoning to elective 
abortions where there is no immediate health risk. The court thus 
accepted Maher and rejected Harris. It was with this conclusion that 
Justice Pashman, concurring in most of the court's reasoning but 
writing separately, disagreed. Justice Pashman perceived no consti-
tutional distinction between funding for medically necessary abortions 
and elective ones. He argued that forcing a woman to bear a child 
against her will inflicts physical as well as psychological injury. 
Further, Justice Pashman echoed the views of the Harris dissenters 
that the withholding of funds coerces women to forego exercising a 
fundamental right. 61 
In dissent, Justice O'Hern argued that the issue of abortion is 
one of national concern, and that on such issues the states should 
v. Wade, this Court intimated that a woman who had contracted 
rubella during her pregnancy had a right to choose whether to give 
birth to a defective child or undergo an abortion. That intimation 
became a reality in Berman v. Allen, in which the Court held that a 
woman had a cause of action for deprivation of the right to decide 
whether to bear a child with Down's Syndrome. We reaffirmed that 
right last year in Schroeder v. Perkel, holding that a mother, after 
giving birth to a child with cystic fibrosis, had a right to choose 
whether to conceive a second child who might suffer from the same 
genetic defect. 
ld. at 303-04, 450 A.2d at 933-34 (citation omitted). 
59. ld. at 305, 450 A.2d at 934. 
60. The court wrote in pertinent part: 
Concededly, the Legislature need not fund any of the costs of medi-
cally necessary procedures pertaining to pregnancy; conversely, it could 
include in its Medicaid plan medically necessary abortions for which 
federal reimbursement is not available .... Nor is it neutral to provide 
one woman with the means to protect her life at the expense of a 
fetus and to force another woman to sacrifice her health to protect a 
potential life. 
ld. at 306-07, 450 A.2d at 935 (footnotes omitted; citation omitted). 
61. ld. at 318-33, 450 A.2d at 941-49 (Pashman, J., concurring). 
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yield to the Supreme Court. On the merits, the dissent agreed with 
Harris's holding that the government's obligation not to interfere 
with a particular course of conduct does not impose an obligation to 
actively support conduct tending in the opposite direction.62 
Other state courts have relied on different constitutional theories 
to reach the same result as Byrne with respect to medically necessary 
abortions. In Moe v. Secretary of Administration & Finance,63 the 
controversy centered on a Massachusetts statute which limited medi-
caid payments for abortions to those required to prevent the death 
of the potential mother. These restrictions were challenged by three 
individual plaintiffs, each of whom was a pregnant woman whose 
physician believed that an abortion was medically needed, but could 
not certify that the procedure was necessary to prevent death. A 
fourth plaintiff, a physician who provided gynecological care under 
the medical assistance program, sued on behalf of both himself and 
similarly situated physicians who were willing to perform abortions 
not necessary to prevent imminent death.64 
After disposing of a number of technical defenses, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts reached the merits and found that 
the statute contravened the guarantee of due process secured by the 
Massachusetts Constitution. In reaching this decision, the court in 
Moe noted that, in a series of cases, the Massachusetts courts had 
recognized a constitutionally protected guarantee of privacy that went 
beyond federal precedent. 6S 
After summarizing the reasoning of the Harris majority, the 
court in Moe rejected the Harris analysis. Recognizing that a state 
may be selective in the benefits it dispenses, the court stressed that 
such selectivity may not constitutionally burden a fundamental right. 
Moreover, the court in Moe added that such a burden is no more 
permissible because it is indirect than it would be if direct, and in 
determining whether an improper burden has been imposed, a court 
should be sensitive to the practical realities of the situation.66 
Turning to the statute before it, the court recognized that lan-
guage couching its purpose in terms of encouraging childbirth "does 
not camouflage the simple fact that the purpose, more starkly ex-
62. [d. at 334-35, 450 A.2d at 949-51 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). 
63. 382 Mass. 629,417 N.E.2d 387 (1981). 
64. [d. at 638, 417 N.E.2d at 393. 
65. The court in Moe said: "In sum, we deal in this case with the application of 
principles to which this court is no stranger, and in an area in which our 
constitutional guarantee of due process has sometimes impelled us to go further 
than the United States Supreme Court." [d. at 649, 417 N.E.2d at 399. 
66. [d. at 652, 417 N.E.2d at 401 (citing Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) 
(indirect interference with freedom of speech contravenes the first amendment». 
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pressed, is discouraging abortion.' '67 The court found persuasive 
Justice Brennan's reasoning from his dissenting opinion in Harris-
that is, a statute similar to the Hyde Amendment unconstitutionally 
acts to coerce indigent women into maternity, thus depriving them of 
their option to choose an abortion protected by Roe. 
Finding that the statute restricted a fundamental right, the court 
in Moe turned next to the government's justification for this restric-
tion-the potential for human life. The court rejected the argument 
that this interest does not become compelling until the fetus is viable, 
and sought guidance from its own precedents. Discussing in detail a 
case in which a prison inmate wished to forego medical treatment 
necessary to preserve his life,68 the court reviewed the relevant criteria 
for intrusiveness of medical procedures and the integrity of the medical 
profession-factors which had led the court to require the inmate to 
undergo the procedure. 
In the abortion context, the court in Moe found it decisive that 
a woman deprived of a medically necessary abortion would be forced 
against her will to carry a child for nine months, to bear it, and to 
accept all of the physical and psychological consequences of having 
given birth. The court in Moe found this intrusion to be constitu-
tionally unsupportable, and as a result, ordered the funding of med-
ically necessary abortions. 69 
Chief Justice Hennessey dissented, finding that the majority had 
perceived constitutional obstacles to the acceptance of abortions where 
none had existed. Citing Harris, the dissent concluded that the ma-
jority was intruding on what is fundamentally a legislative determi-
nation.70 
Elements of both Moe and Byrne can be found in the Superior 
Court of Connecticut's decision in Doe v. Maher. 71 At issue there 
was a state regulation which restricted medicaid funding for abortions 
to those procedures necessary to preserve the life of the potential 
mother. In a sweeping opinion, the intermediate appellate court held 
that the restriction violated the due process, equal protection, and 
equal rights guarantees under the state's constitution.72 
The facts before the court warranted sympathy and may have 
been given in detail to provide support for the court's decision. The 
67. [d. at 654, 417 N.E.2d at 402 (quoting Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: 
A Comment on the Supreme Court's Role in American Government, 66 GEO. 
L.J. 1191, 1196 (1978». 
68. Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452 (1979). 
69. Moe, 382 Mass. at 658-59, 417 N.E.2d at 404. 
70. [d. at 664, 417 N.E.2d at 406-07 (H~nnessey, C.J., dissenting). 
71. 40 Conn. Supp. 394, 515 A.2d 134 (1986). 
72. This holding was limited to medically necessary abortions; purely elective 
procedures were not before the court. 
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plaintiff described by the court was a welfare mother who needed an 
abortion to reduce the risks of a diagnostic procedure designed to 
disclose the presence of cervical cancer. The class that she represented 
was characterized by the court as "the poorest of the poor. "73 The 
court described in dramatic detail both the living conditions and 
health problems of the members of the plaintiff's class, clearly fore-
shadowing a result in favor of the plaintiff on the merits. 
The legal analysis focused first on the statutory validity of the 
challenged regulation, and resulted in a holding that the restriction 
was illegal as a matter of state statutory law. Nevertheless, the court 
wrote that the "real issue" in the case was the constitutional chal-
lenge-a challenge that "should be answered. "74 In providing that 
answer, the court in Doe first declared its independence from the 
Supreme Court's funding decisions.75 Turning to the validity of the 
restriction on abortion funding under the Connecticut Constitution, 
the court found three separate violations. Discussing the right to 
substantive due process, the court praised Roe, rejected Harris, and 
found a fundamental right to procreative choice in the privacy guar-
antee of the Connecticut Constitution. 76 
73. Doe, 40 Conn. Supp. at 406, 515 A.2d at 140. 
74. Id. at 417-18, 515 A.2d at 146. 
75. The court in Doe discussed its state's constitutional independence as follows: 
The plaintiffs raise only state constitutional grounds to invalidate the 
regulation. In making these determinations, the court must interpret 
our state constitution independently of the United States constitution 
when required by its text, history, tradition and intent. It is clear that 
the federal constitution merely establishes a minimum national stan-
dard for the exercise of individual liberties and rights. Nevertheless, 
the underpinnings of any such decision must rest on independent and 
adequate state grounds. 
Id. at 418 n.29, 515 A.2d at 146-47 n.29 (citations omitted). 
76. The court discussed the right to procreative choice in the following passage: 
It is absolutely clear that the right of privacy is implicit in 
Connecticut's ordered liberty. The Connecticut Supreme Court has 
recognized that aspect of privacy which includes procreative choice as 
a fundamental right. And more recently, the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut again recognized the right of privacy in Ochs v. Borrelli. 
Surely, the state constitutional right to privacy includes a woman's 
guaranty of freedom of procreative choice. The decision whether or 
not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of this cluster of 
constitutionally protected choices. That decision holds a particularly 
important place in the history of the right of privacy, a right first 
explicitly recognized in an opinion holding unconstitutional a statute 
prohibiting the use of contraceptives . . . and most prominently vin-
dicated in recent years in the context of contraception ... and 
abortion. This is understandable, for in a field that by definition 
concerns the most intimate of human activities and relationships, 
decisions whether to accomplish or to prevent conception are among 
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Citing Moe and the Supreme Court of California's decision in 
Committee to De/end Reproductive Rights v. Myers, n the court in 
Doe held that as a matter of due process, once the state began to 
confer assistance for medically necessary procedures, it could not do 
so in a manner which discriminated against abortions. 78 The court 
also ruled for the plaintiffs under the equal protection clause and 
equal rights amendment of the Connecticut Constitution.79 With re-
spect to traditional equal protection analysis, the court's reasoning 
echoes that of the cases discussed earlier in this section-the state's 
discrimination between medically necessary abortions and all other 
medically necessary procedures infringes on a fundamental right to 
choose an abortion, and is not justified by any compelling state 
interest. 
Doe was novel in its additional reliance on the Connecticut equal 
rights amendment in striking down the funding restriction. Thus, the 
Doe court found the funding restriction to be invalid under three 
separate guarantees of the state constitution. Noting that the existence 
of the Connecticut equal rights amendment lent strength to the case 
for the plaintiff, the court offered three reasons why restrictions on 
abortion funding discriminates against women. First, all medical 
expenses necessary to restore a male to health are covered by the 
program, while medically necessary abortions are denied to women 
who need them. Second, all of a male's expenses relating to repro-
ductive health and family planning are reimbursed. Third, "[s]ince 
time immemorial, women's biology and ability to bear children have 
been used as a basis for discrimination against them. "80 
the most private and sensitive. "If the right of privacy means anything, 
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free of 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 
[d. at 425-26, 515 A.2d at 150 (citations omitted). 
77. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981). 
78. Doe, 40 Conn. Supp. at 431-32, 515 A.2d at 153. 
79. "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected 
to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil 
or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, 
sex, or physical or mental disability." CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20. Article I, § 
20 was amended in 1974 by adding the words "her" and "sex," and in 1984 
by adding the phrase "or physical or mental disability." Doe, 40 Conn. Supp. 
at 440-41 n.51, 515 A.2d at 158 n.51. 
80. The Doe court went on to describe the third reason: 
Since only women become pregnant, discrimination against pregnancy 
by not funding abortion when it is medically necessary and when all 
other medical expenses are paid by the state for both men and women 
is sex oriented discrimination. "Pregnancy is a condition unique to 
women, and the ability to become pregnant is a primary characteristic 
of the female sex. Thus any classification which relies on pregnancy 
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Somewhat different reasoning led the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia to a similar result in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights 
v. Myers,S! where the court expressly addressed the social cons~quences 
resulting from the birth of unwanted children into welfare families. 
At issue in Myers was the validity of California statutory budget 
provisions analogous to the Hyde Amendment. After emphasizing 
that the morality of abortion was not an issue before the court, the 
court proceeded to find the reasoning of Harris contrary to California 
law. 
Reviewing state court precedent, the court concluded that once 
the state has elected to make benefits available, it bears a heavy 
burden of justifying the withholding of benefits from persons choosing 
to exercise a constitutional right. For example, in People v. Belous,s2 
the Supreme Court of California, even before Roe, had struck down 
a criminal abortion statute in part because a state constitutional right 
of privacy was found to safeguard a woman's right to procreative 
choice. The court in Belous also found that a therapeutic abortion is 
a perfectly legitimate medical procedure. Since the funding restriction 
prevented an indigent woman from undergoing that procedure, the 
court in Myers found that it ran afoul of the California Constitution. 
Unlike the cases previously cited, the court in Myers openly 
discussed the social cost of "unwanted" children, and rejected the 
state's argument that the government has a right to favor childbirth. 
In addition, the court confronted the specter of an increase in the 
population of indigent children, and in rejecting the state's asserted 
justification, effectively made a value judgment that provisions anal-
ogous to the Hyde Amendment are socially dangerous. s3 
Still another theory for reaching the same result was adopted by 
the Court of Appeals of Oregon in Planned Parenthood Association 
v. Department of Human Resources.84 There, a funding restriction 
as the determinative criterion is a distinction based on sex." Professor 
Tribe put it well when he wrote: "If one were ... to recognize, as 
the Supreme Court sometimes has, that 'the grossest discrimination 
can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly 
alike,' then it might be possible to discern an invidious discrimination 
against women, or at least a constitutionally problematic subordination 
of women, in the law's very indifference to the biological reality that 
sometimes requires them, but never requires their male counterparts, 
to resort to abortion procedures if they are to avoid pregnancy and 
childbearing. ' , 
Doe, 40 Conn. Supp. at 444-45, 515 A.2d at 159-60 (citations omitted). 
81. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981). 
82. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 
915 (1970). 
83. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 278, 625 P.2d at 795, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 881-82. 
84. 63 Or. App. 41, 663 P.2d 1247 (1983), a/I'd, 297 Or. 562, 687 P.2d 785 (1984) 
(en bane). 
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similar to the Hyde Amendment was struck down as violative of the 
privileges and immunities clause of the Oregon Constitution.8s The 
intermediate appellate court balanced the detriment to a cognizable 
class of citizens against the state's asserted justification. The class of 
citizens recognized by the court was those women for whom an 
abortion is medically necessary. 
The court in Planned Parenthood considered the arguments that 
the funding restriction saved the government money and that the state 
has a compelling interest in the potential for human life. The court 
rejected both of these arguments. With respect to the fiscal argument 
the court simply held that the government had failed to carry its 
burden of proof, and noted that no rebuttal had been offered to the 
counterargument that the expenses of childbirth and raising a child 
in a welfare family far outweigh the costs of medically necessary 
abortions. With regard to the potentiality for life justification, the 
court found in Roe at least an equally compelling interest in national 
health-an interest defeated by the administrative rule at issue. The 
court, therefore, held that the funding restriction contravened the 
state's constitution.86 
Recently, in In re T. W., 87 the Supreme Court of Florida recog-
nized a right of abortion under its state's constitution. At issue in 
T. W. was the validity of a state statute requiring parental consent or 
a judicial substitute before a minor could obtain an abortion. Basing 
its holding firmly on Florida law, the court found the statute invalid 
under article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution, which provides 
that "every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from 
governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise pro-
vided herein. "88 The court held that this provision mandates a right 
of privacy broader and stronger than that provided by the federal 
constitution. As a result, any intrusion into personal privacy must 
satisfy two tests: first, it must be justified by a compelling state 
interest, and second, it must accomplish its purpose through the least 
intrusive means possible.89 
Applying this analytical framework to the matter before it, the 
court found that the decision whether or not to bear a child is at the 
core of a constitutional right of privacy. Moreover, this constitution-
ally protected choice is possessed by both minors and adults, since 
both groups fall within the class of "natural persons" under the 
85. "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, 
or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all 
citizens." OR. CONST. art. I, § 20. 
86. Planned Parenthood, 63 Or. App. at 62, 663 P.2d at 1259-61. 
87. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989). 
88. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. 
89. T. W., 551 So. 2d at 1192. 
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involved constitutional provision. Turning to the asserted govern-
mental interests, the court, which earlier in its opinion had brushed 
Webster aside in a single sentence, essentially adopted Roe as the law 
of Florida. Thus, the health of the mother was found not to become 
a compelling state interest until at least the close of the first trimester. 
The state's other important interest, the potentiality of life, does not 
become compelling until viability-approximately at the end of the 
second trimester. 90 
Turning its focus to the parental consent law, the court in T. W. 
agreed that the state could legitimately give weight to the protection 
of an immature potential mother and to the preservation of the family 
unit. Nevertheless, in order to save the funding restriction, the court 
said that these considerations must be compelling under the Florida 
framework. Given the fundamental nature of the right to procreative 
choice, the court held that these interests did not sustain sufficient 
weight. Thus, the court struck down the parental consent requirement.91 
It is important to note that not all state courts have accepted the 
argument that funding restrictions are incompatible with rights secured 
by state constitutions. In Fischer v. Department oj Public Welfare,92 
for example, plaintiffs challenged two Pennsylvania statutes which 
essentially paralleled the most restrictive version of the Hyde Amend-
ment. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania recognized its au-
thority under the Pennsylvania Constitution to depart from Harris and 
Maher, but found those precedents persuasive and elected to follow 
them. Reasoning that Roe established only a qualified right of abortion, 
which need not be financially supported by the government, the court 
wrote: "A woman's freedom of choice does not carry with it a 
constitutional entitlement to every financial resource with which to 
avail herself of the full range of protected choices. "93 The Supreme 
90. [d. at 1193. 
91. The court noted as well that the statute failed the "least intrusive measures" 
test, in that its provision of judicial bypass of parental consent afforded the 
minor neither a right to counsel nor an on-the-record hearing. [d. at 1196. 
92. 85 Pa. Commw. 240, 482 A.2d 1148, aii'd, 509 Pa. 293, 502 A.2d 114 (1985). 
93. [d. at 256, 482 A.2d at 1157. The court went on to hold: 
[A] citizen has a constitutional right to travel but is not entitled to 
travel at the public expense. One has a constitutional right to freedom 
of expression but is not entitled to the use of public funds to finance 
the expounding of personal views. The economic constraints on the 
woman who would terminate her pregnancy are not caused by the 
Commonwealth. Her financial problems exist and continue to exist 
whether she elects to choose one or the other alternative. These 
problems are not the consequence of any action or legislation on the 
part of the Commonwealth. 
[d. (citation omitted). 
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Court of Pennsylvania affirmed by simply offering a series of quota-
tions from Harris and Maher. 94 
B. Challenges to Abortion Funding Predicated on State 
Constitutional Provisions 
State constitutional provisions have been used to challenge state 
funding of abortion.9s For example, in Starn v. State,96 a taxpayer filed 
a declaratory judgment action, challenging the appropriation of state 
funds for elective abortions for indigent women. The plaintiff theorized, 
inter alia, that a fetus is a "person" for purposes of North Carolina's 
guarantees of due process and equal protection. 
The court of appeals rejected this argument and upheld the 
appropriation. Noting that the Supreme Court in Roe had rejected an 
analogous contention under the federal constitution, the court explored 
the state's criminal laws concerning the homicide of a fetus and its 
civil laws respecting the capacity of an unborn child to hold and inherit 
property. In each context, the court found that North Carolina law 
did not confer upon an unborn child the same legal status as after live 
birth. 
The court went on to note that the plaintiff's position was bur-
dened by practical problems. For example, recognition of fetal rights 
might cast doubt on the state's authority to fund any abortion, no 
matter how medically necessary. Also, in the absence of state funding 
for elective abortions, indigent women might nevertheless undergo the 
procedure without the medical safeguards that state funding promotes. 
The court thus rejected all of the appellant's challenges and upheld 
the appropriation. 
C. Direct Regulation of Abortion Funding in the Text of State 
Constitutions 
In some states, efforts have been made to directly amend the state 
constitution to restrict or prohibit abortion funding. In Colorado, the 
effort to amend that state's constitution to prohibit state funding of 
abortions succeeded.97 Similarly, in Rhode Island the text of the state 
94. Fischer v. Department of Public Welfare, 509 Pa. 293, 502 A.2d 114 (1985). 
95. See, e.g., McKee v. County of Ramsey, 316 N.W.2d 555 (Minn.), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 860 (1982). 
96. 47 N.C. App. 209, 267 S.E.2d 335 (1980), a/I'd in part, rev'd in part, 302 
N.C. 357,275 S.E.2d 439 (1981). For further developments in the unsuccessful 
effort of Paul Starn, Jr., to challenge abortion funding in North Carolina, see 
Starn v. Hunt, 66 N.C. App. 116, 310 S.E.2d 623 (1984). 
97. The Colorado Constitution now provides in part: 
No public funds shall be used by the State of Colorado, its agencies 
or political subdivisions to payor otherwise reimburse, either directly 
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constitution governs the right to and the funding of abortions. The 
Rhode Island Declaration of Rights contains the phrase: "Nothing 
in this section shall be construed to grant or secure any right relating 
to abortion or the funding thereof. "98 Efforts to enact similar pro-
visions have also been made in other states, but have not as yet 
surmounted all of the various obstacles necessary to amend a state's 
constitution.99 As a result, it is reasonable to anticipate that for the 
foreseeable future, the more frequent focus of the constitutional 
battle will probably be on the established constitutional theories of 
due process and equal protection. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF ANTI-ABORTION 
DEMONSTRATIONS 
After the question of funding, the most bitterly contested battle 
in the war over abortion focuses on the efforts of anti-abortion 
demonstrators to use their rights of freedom of speech and assembly 
to apply pressure to women considering an abortion and the physi-
cians willing to perform the procedure. Although on the surface the 
regulation of anti-abortion demonstrations may seem to be only 
or indirectly, any person, agency or facility for the performance of 
any induced abortion, PROVIDED HOWEVER, that the General 
Assembly, by specific bill, may authorize and appropriate funds to 
be used for those medical services necessary to prevent the death of 
either a pregnant woman or her unborn child under circumstances 
where every reasonable effort is made to preserve the life of each. 
COLO. CONST. art. V, § 50. Even this provision has not resulted in a total 
prohibition of public funding for abortion in Colorado. See Urbish v. Lamm, 
761 P.2d 756 (Colo. 1988). 
98. R.1. CONST. art. I, § 2. Article I, § 2, of the Rhode Island Constitution reads 
as follows: 
All free governments are instituted for the protection, safety, and 
happiness of the people. All laws, therefore, should be made for the 
good of the whole; and the burdens of the state ought to be fairly 
distributed among its citizens. No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person 
be denied equal protection of the laws. No otherwise qualified person 
shall, solely by reason of race, gender or handicap be subject to 
discrimination by the state, its agents or any person or entity doing 
business with the state. Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
grant or secure any right relating to abortion or the funding thereof. 
[d. (emphasis added). 
99. See, e.g., Arkansas Women's Political Caucus v. Riviere, 283 Ark. 463, 677 
S.W.2d 846 (1984) (concerning a dispute over the language of the ballot title 
of proposed constitutional amendment restricting abortion funding); accord 
Binninger v. Paulus, 297 Or. 179, 681 P.2d 129 (1984). The lesson of these 
cases is that attempts to enact such amendments will be bitterly litigated every 
step of the way. 
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tangentially related to the right to obtain an abortion, in actuality, 
the right to obtain an abortion is often contingent upon one having 
access to a facility willing to perform the procedure. And, as will be 
shown, anti-abortion activists frequently attempt and are often suc-
cessful in making access to abortion facilities difficult. 
In numerous cases, the clash between demonstrators and clinics 
or physicians performing abortions have been resolved in the appellate 
courts. Typically, the question is how far the demonstrators may 
intrude upon and interfere with the normal use of private property 
in the course of disseminating their message. Under state and federal 
constitutions, courts have been called on to balance guarantees of 
freedom of expression with the right of autonomy in the operation 
of a business on private property. 
The United States Supreme Court was called on to render its 
opinion in Frisby v. Schultz. 1°O Frisby involved the validity, under 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, of an ordi-
nance of the town of Brookfield, Wisconsin, which provided that it 
was "unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or about 
the residence or dwelling of any individual in the Town of Brook-
field." 101 The genesis of this ordinance was clear. Anti-abortion 
activists had begun to regularly picket on the public streets surround-
ing the home of a physician who performed abortions in two neigh-
boring towns. In addition to carrying signs, the picketers shouted 
slogans, warned neighborhood children to stay away from the horne 
of the "baby killer," and trespassed onto the physician's property. 102 
In response, the town government enacted the disputed ordinance. 
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, viewed the case as 
involving a traditional first amendment issue, and was of the opinion 
that the ordinance was a proper exercise of governmental authority. 
The Court first found that streets, even in a residential neighborhood, 
comprise a traditional public forum. That being the case, even a 
facially content-neutral restriction on speech must permit alternative 
means of communication and must be narrowly drawn to serve a 
significant governmental interest. 
The Court found numerous alternative means for the protesters 
to get their message across-marches, door-to-door proselytizing, the 
mails, and telephone contact were all deemed to be available substi-
tutes. What gave the majority greater pause was the existence of a 
governmental interest sufficient to overcome the restriction on speech 
100. 487 u.s. 474 (1988). 
101. [d. at 477. 
102. [d. at 494. Ironically, these facts are supplied by the dissenters, who would 
have struck down the ordinance. The majority, which found the restriction on 
speech to be valid, painted a much more sedate picture of the protesters' 
activities. 
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imposed by the town law. This interest was ultimately found in the 
protection of residential privacy. The Court concluded that an indi-
vidual has a right to avoid unwanted speech in the privacy of his 
home, and that the ordinance was designed to effectuate that right. 
Finding the focus of the protesters on a single residence offensive, 
the Court held that the ordinance properly regulated that form of 
protest. 103 
State courts have recently grappled with similar issues under 
their own constitutions. In Chico Feminist Women's Health Center 
v. Scully,I04 an abortion clinic sought an injunction preventing dem-
onstrators from obtaining a vantage point from which they could 
observe prospective patients of the clinic closely enough to identify 
them. This request developed as a result of the demonstrators in-
forming relatives of prospective patients that a member of their 
family was contemplating an abortion, thus generating pressure on 
the potential mother to abandon her plans. The clinic relied on the 
right to privacy secured by the California Constitution as construed 
in Myers. lOS 
The Supreme Court of California in Scully held that the clinic 
was not entitled to the requested relief. It reasoned that a privacy 
right only existed if the clinic's clients could reasonably expect privacy 
in light of the common habits of the community. A significant 
possibility of being recognized on the street is simply part of life in 
a small town. I06 The court went on to note that even if a limited 
103. [d. at 482-88. A further irony in Frisby (or perhaps evidence of doctrinal 
consistency and intellectual honesty) is that the majority was primarily com-
prised of abortion opponents (O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia and Kennedy, who 
were joined by Blackmun) while the dissenters Brennan, Marshall and Stevens-
all adherents to Roe-found that first amendment principles favored the anti-
abortion protesters. 
104. 208 Cal. App. 3d 230, 256 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1989). 
105. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. 
106. The Scully court pointed out the following: 
The very "small-town" characteristics that prompted the Center to 
request its injunctive relief are the very characteristics that make the 
relief inappropriate. Because Chico is a small city, the clients are more 
likely to be recognized. But that increased chance of recognition on 
a public street is a "common habit" of Chico. We have no doubt 
that Chico's smaller size makes it a most attractive place to live in 
many respects. But the clients who are residents of Chico must accept 
the limitations of small-city life along with its amenities. One of those 
limitations is a greater chance of recognition in public places by other 
citizens. Having chosen to live in the environment of a small city, the 
residents of Chico cannot expect the courts, by way of injunctive 
relief, to guarantee them the kind of anonymity they might find in a 
"large metropolitan community" such as New York City. We are 
confident that, judged by the "common habits" of Chico as described 
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privacy interest could exist on the public streets surrounding an 
abortion clinic, additional considerations nevertheless militated against 
the requested relief. Central to the court's reasoning was the protec-
tion of the demonstrators' right to freedom of speech. Citing Frisby 
and other authorities, the court held that picketing was the only 
effective way for the protesters to get their message across-no 
reasonable alternative existed. Therefore, the requested injunctive 
relief was not appropriate. 
In other cases, private property rights have prevailed. For ex-
ample, in Brown v. Davis,107 the Superior Court of New Jersey held 
that private citizens may not "enter upon the common areas of a 
multi-business office complex to espouse an anti-abortion thesis di-
rected to prospective patients of one of the tenants without the 
consent of the landlord-owner." lOS 
In Brown, a landowner had erected three multiple-tenant struc-
tures on a two-acre plot. In one of those buildings, the defendant 
clinic offered a range of gynecological services, including abortions. 
The plaintiffs were anti-abortion protesters who carried placards 
espousing a right-to-life theme. Standing forty-five to one hundred 
feet from the building, the plaintiffs called or shouted to patients in 
an effort to dissuade them from obtaining an abortion. Not wishing 
to limit their picketing to public streets, the plaintiffs filed suit to 
establish their right to enter the sidewalks and parking lots adjacent 
to the building housing the clinic. Among their goals was to confront 
prospective patients on a one-to-one basis. 109 
The plaintiff protesters relied on both the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and a similar provision in the New 
Jersey Constitution. 110 The superior court found it necessary to 
address both claims. With respect to the first amendment claim, the 
court reasoned that a protester's right to enter upon private property 
is measured by the extent to which that property is devoted to public 
use. Here, the court found no such dedication, and therefore, rejected 
the federal constitutional claim. 
by the Center's own administrator, the clients had no reasonable 
expectation of anonymity on Chico's public' sidewalks and streets 
between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. on Saturdays. 
Scully, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 242, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 200. 
107. 203 N.J. Super. 41, 495 A.2d 900 (1984). For subsequent litigation arising out 
of the same dispute; with the same result, see State v. Brown, 212 N.J. Super. 
61, 513 A.2d 974, cert. denied, 107 N.J. 53, 526 A.2d 140 (1986). 
108. Brown, 203 N.J. Super. at 45, 495 A.2d at 902. 
109. [d. 
110. "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all 
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed 
to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press .... " N.J. CONST. 
art. I, § 6. 
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The court in Brown next turned to the state constitution, and 
began its analysis by noting that "[t]he New Jersey State Constitution 
has been interpreted more broadly than the Federal Constitution to 
permit the exercise of expressional rights on private property in 
certain circumstances. "111 In support of this premise, the superior 
court relied on the Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision in State 
v. Schmid. ll2 In that case, the court had developed a three-pronged 
test designed to strike a fair balance between expressional rights and 
the security of private property. The relevant criteria were held to 
be: (1) the normal use and purpose of the property involved; (2) the 
extent and nature of the public's invitation to use the property; and 
(3) the relationship between the purpose of the expressional activity 
and the use of the property. In addition, the supreme court in Schmid 
had found it relevant whether or not alternative means existed for 
the desired dissemination of views. ll3 
Applying these criteria, the court in Brown had no difficulty in 
ruling against the protesters. Central to the court's reasoning was 
the essentially private nature of the operation of the clinic. Unlike a 
shopping center, it provided no facilities for the gathering of the 
general public. Its "invitation" to the community at-large took the 
form of advertisement of specific services for those who needed 
them; not an offering of any service to the public at-large. Finally, 
the expressional activity was incompatible with many services of the 
clinic which had nothing to do with abortion-the facility was forced 
to provide escorts for its patients to guide them through the protes-
ters, even if the patients sought general gynecological care unrelated 
to an abortion.1I4 On the basis of this reasoning, the court in Brown 
ruled that the protesters had no right to enter upon the property of 
the defendants. 
A year after Brown was decided, a separate panel of the Superior 
Court of New Jersey reviewed Planned Parenthood of Monmouth 
County, Inc. v. Cannizzaro. liS There, Planned Parenthood, which 
offered gynecological services including first trimester abortions, filed 
suit to enjoin picketers from trespassing upon its property. The 
defendants had picketed the property for years, shouting a variety 
of insults including comparison of the clinic's operators to concen-
tration camp personnel and murderers. On one occasion, the defen-
dants entered the building, engaged in a "shoving match," and were 
forcibly ejected. 1I6 
111. Brown, 203 N.J. Super. at 46, 495 A.2d at 903. 
112. 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed sub nom. Princeton Univ. 
v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982). 
113. [d. at 563, 423 A.2d at 630. 
114. Brown, 203 N.J. Super. at 46-48, 495 A.2d at 903-04. 
115. 204 N.J. Super. 531, 499 A.2d 535 (1985). 
116. [d. at 535, 499 A.2d at 537. 
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The court analyzed under the state constitution the competing 
contentions that the plaintiffs operated a private enterprise, and that 
the defendants possessed a right of freedom of expression. The 
defendants also asserted that, as a recipient of public funds, Planned 
Parenthood was not truly operating a private concern. 
The Cannizzaro court applied a "sliding scale" rule-the greater 
the devotion of the picketed entity to a public use, the greater its 
obligation to accommodate expressional activity.117 In finding that 
the clinic was essentially private despite its acceptance of public 
funds, the court quoted extensively from Byrne,118 and reasoned that 
it is difficult to imagine an activity more private than the gynecolog-
ical services rendered by the plaintiffs. The court also found that the 
tactics of the picketers went beyond mere speech and had been 
properly categorized by the trial court as "intimidating and harass-
ing" conduct. 119 The court in Cannizzaro thus affirmed the injunctive 
relief granted by the trial court which barred the picketers from the 
clinic property and limited them to nonobstructive activity on the 
surrounding public sidewalks. 
The reasoning of these New Jersey cases was followed by the 
Supreme Court of Delaware in State v. ElliottYo In Elliott, defen-
dants challenged their convictions for criminal trespass arising out 
of an anti-abortion demonstration on the grounds of the Delaware 
Women's Health Organization. The demonstrators had insisted on 
entering the property of the clinic, which provided a range of 
gynecological services including abortions, even though they were 
able to get the same message across from the grounds of a neigh-
boring grocery store. As in Brown, the demonstrators shouted epithets 
that the clinic's physician was a murderer. This created an atmosphere 
characterized by the court as "volatile." 121 
Applying both the Delaware and United States constitutions, the 
court held that the defendants' convictions did not contravene their 
right of freedom of assembly. In so holding, the court found per-
suasive and applied the analysis of the New Jersey cases cited above. 
The court emphasized the fact that the clinic was private, with no 
dedication to public use. The clinic had been housed in a single 
structure set apart from others, with no general invitation for the 
public to use its facjlities. Finally, the expressional activity of the 
demonstrators interfered with services unrelated to abortion. Weigh-
117. [d. at 538, 499 A.2d at 538. 
118. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text. 
119. Cannizzaro, 204 N.J. Super. at 543, 499 A.2d at 542. 
120. 548 A.2d 28 (Del. 1988). 
121. [d. at 31. 
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ing these factors, the court found no constitutional obstacle to the 
defendants' convictions. 122 
In each of these cases the appellate court held that anti-abortion 
demonstrators are free to picket along public streets and roads 
surrounding an abortion clinic to express their disapproval of abor-
tions. Anti-abortion protesters may not, however, come onto the 
property of the clinic itself to harass and intimidate prospective 
patients. This is particularly true if the clinic provides services other 
than abortions, or if an alternative method is available for the 
protesters to convey their message. 
v. THE LAW OF ABORTION IN MARYLAND 
In the 1991 legislative session, the Maryland General Assembly 
significantly changed the state's statutes concerning abortion. Prior 
to July 1, 1991, section 20-208 of the Health-General article of the 
Maryland Code forbade the performance of any abortion except 
where the abortion is performed before the twenty-seventh week of 
gestationl23 in an accredited hospital by a licensed physician and: (1) 
the pregnancy would likely result in the death of the mother; (2) 
there is a substantial risk that the pregnancy would impair the physical 
or mental health of the mother; (3) there is a substantial risk that 
the child will have "grave permanent physical deformity or mental 
retardation;" or (4) the pregnancy resulted from rape. l2A In addition, 
a hospital abortion review committee must authorize in writing the 
performance of each abortion and must "keep written records of all 
requests for authorization and its action thereon." 125 
122. [d. at 32-33. A similar scenario was before the Court of Criminal Appeals in 
Crabb v. State, 754 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), cert. denied, 493 
U.S. 815 (1989). In Crabb, trespass convictions were returned when demon-
strators entered the lobby of an abortion clinic, pounding the walls and shouting 
"abortion is murder" in defiance of a police officer's order that they leave. 
Defendants were placed on probation, one condition of which was that they 
stay away from the clinic. Among the many contentions relied on by the 
defendants was an assertion that this condition violated the United States and 
Texas Constitutions in various respects. The court responded that a curtailment 
of constitutional rights is valid if tailored to the circumstances of a particular 
crime. Here, the restriction on the defendants' freedom was limited, protected 
the victim, and reduced the likelihood that the conditions of probation would 
be violated. It was therefore upheld. 
123. The "[n]ot more than twenty-six weeks of gestation" requirement does not 
apply in the case where the fetus is dead or where the pregnancy would likely 
result in the death of the potential mother. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 
20-208(b)(l) (1990). 
124. [d. § 20-208(a)-(b). 
125. [d. § 20-208(b)(2)-(c). 
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Two opiruons of the Maryland Attorney GeneraJ126 and a case 
decided by the court of special appeals l27 have all held section 20-
208 to be unconstitutional in light of Roe and its progeny.128 Earlier 
this year, the General Assembly decided to repeal sections 20-201 to 
-206, -208, -210, and -211 of the Health-General article and replace 
those provisions with a much less restrictive scheme. Therefore, as 
of July 1, 1991, most of Maryland's abortion statutes were replaced 
by much different provisions. 129 
126. See 70 Op. Att'y Gen. 3 (1985); 62 Op. Att'y Gen. 3 (1977). 
127. See Coleman v. Coleman, 57 Md. App. 755,471 A.2d 1115 (1984). 
128. For example, in Coleman, the court said in dicta: 
Any reading of Health-General Art. § 20-208(a) discloses that it 
conflicts with the decisions of the Supreme Court in Doe v. Boiton, 
410 U.S. 179 (1973), as well as Roe v. Wade and City oj Akron in 
that the Maryland statute fails to delineate between terminating the 
pregnancy during the first trimester and any subsequent time. Because 
of that failure, Health-General Art. § 20-208(a) is unconstitutional 
insofar as it conflicts with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States. 
Id. at 760, 471 A.2d at 1118 (citations omitted). 
129. See Act of Feb. 18, 1991, ch. 1, 1991 Md. Laws 5. The preamble to this law 
reads as follows: 
AN ACT concerning Abortion 
FOR the purpose of revising certain statutory provisions relating 
to abortion; authorizing a physician to perform an abortion on an 
unmarried minor without notice to a parent or guardian of the minor 
if, in the professional judgment of the physician, the minor is mature 
and capable of giving informed consent or notice would not be in the 
best interest of the minor; prohibiting a physician from giving notice 
to a parent or guardian if the minor decides not to have the abortion; 
repealing a certain provision of law related to certain information that 
must be provided prior to an abortion; repealing certain provisions 
of law related to abortion referral services; clarifying a provision of 
law related to referral services; requiring that an abortion be performed 
by a licensed physician; providing that the State may not interfere 
with the decision of a woman to terminate a pregnancy if certain 
conditions exist and under certain circumstances; specifying that the 
State may not interfere with a woman's decision to terminate a 
pregnancy at any time if certain circumstances exist; providing a 
certain immunity for a physician under certain circumstances; author-
izing the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to adopt certain 
regulations related to the termination of a human pregnancy; repealing 
a provision of law related to the imposition of certain penalties against 
certain persons who violate certain provisions of law related to the 
termination of a human pregnancy; repealing a provision of law related 
to certain disciplinary actions against a licensed physician for per-
forming an abortion outside a licensed hospital; defining certain terms; 
making provisions of this Act severable; specifying that if a certain 
provision of this Act is petitioned to referendum and rejected by the 
voters, such rejection does not affect other provisions of the Act 
unless the other provisions are also petitioned to referendum and 
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The new section 20-208 simply requires that an abortion be 
performed by a licensed physician. 130 The new section 20-209 codifies 
the Supreme Court's holding in Roe.l3l The state may not interfere 
with the potential mother's right to choose before the fetus is viable. 
Viability is defined under section 20-209(a) as "that stage when, in 
the best medical judgment of the attending physician based on the 
particular facts of the case before the physician, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of the fetus's sustained survival outside of the womb."132 
Even after viability, the state may not interfere with a woman's right 
to terminate the pregnancy if (l) the abortion is necessary to protect 
the life or health of the woman, or (2) the fetus has a genetic defect, 
or a serious deformity or abnormality.133 
The new section 20-209 also authorizes the Maryland Department 
of Health and Mental Hygiene to adopt regulations which are nec-
essary and "least intrusive" to protect the health and life of the 
potential mother, and which are consistent with established medical 
practices. Finally, the new section 20-209 grants immunity from civil 
liability or criminal penalties to physicians who perform abortions in 
accordance with section 20-209, so long as the decision to perform 
the abortion is made in good faith, in the "physician's best medical 
rejected by the voters; and generally relating to abortion. 
[d. at 5. 
130. [d. at 8 (to be codified at MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-208). 
131. [d. at 9 (to be codified at MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-209). The new 




(a) In this section, "viable" means that stage when, in the best 
medical judgment of the attending physician based on the particular 
facts of the case before the physician, there is a reasonable likelihood 
of the fetus's sustained survival outside the womb. 
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the state may 
not interfere with the decision of a woman to terminate a pregnancy: 
(1) Before the fetus is viable; or 
(2) At any time during the woman's pregnancy, if: (i) The 
termination procedure is necessary to protect the life or health of the 
woman; or (ii) The fetus is affected by genetic defect or serious 
deformity or abnormality. 
(c) The Department may adopt regulations that: 
(1) Are both necessary and the least intrusive method to 
protect the life or health of the woman; and 
(2) Are not inconsistent with established medical practice. 
(d) The physician is not liable for civil damages or subject to a 
criminal penalty for a decision to perform an abortion under this 
section made in good faith and in the physician's best medical judg-
ment in accordance with accepted standards of medical practice. 
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judgment," and "in accordance with accepted standards of medical 
practice. "134 
The 1991 General Assembly also modified the parental notifi-
cation requirement for minors who seek abortions. Under the prior 
version of section 20-103 of the Health-General article, a physician 
generally cannot perform an abortion on an unmarried minor unless 
the physician first notifies the minor's parent or guardian. 135 There 
were formerly two exceptions to this general rule. First, a physician 
may perform an abortion on an unmarried minor if the minor does 
not live with a parent or guardian, and a "reasonable effort" to 
give notice is unsuccessful. 136 Second, a physician can perform such 
an abortion "if, in the professional judgment of the physician, notice 
to the parent or guardian may lead to physical or emotional abuse 
of the minor."137 
Under the newly adopted version of section 20-103, the general 
rule and the current exceptions have remained the same, however, 
two additional exceptions have been added. 138 Under the new section 
20-103, a physician can perform an abortion on a minor without 
notice to the minor's parent or guardian if, in the professional 
judgment of the physician, (1) "[t]he minor is mature and capable 
of giving informed consent to an abortion," or (2) "[n]otification 
would not be in the best interest of the minor." 139 
Although the Maryland courts have not had the occasion to 
consider whether funding for abortions for the poor is protected by 
the Constitution, the court of appeals has held that a broadly worded 
statute required funding for abortions. In Kindley v. Governor of 
Maryland,l40 the court considered whether and to what extent a state 
134. [d. 
135. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-103(a) (1990) ("Except as provided in 
subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a physician may not perform an abortion 
on an unmarried minor unless the physician first gives notice to a parent or 
guardian of the minor."). 
136. [d. § 20-103(b). 
137. [d. § 20-103(c). 
13S. See Act of Feb. IS, 1991, ch. 1, 1991 Md. Laws 6-7 (to be codified as MD. 
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-103(c». The new § 20-103(c) reads as follows: 
[d. 
(1) The physician may perform the abortion, without notice to a 
parent or guardian of a minor if, in the professional judgment of the 
physician: (i) Notice to the parent or guardian may lead to physical 
or emotional abuse of the minor; (ii) The minor is mature and capable 
of giving informed consent to an abortion; or (iii) Notification would 
not be in the best interest of the minor. 
(2) The physician is not liable for civil damages or subject to a 
criminal penalty for a decision under this subsection not to give notice. 
139. [d. § 20-103(c)(1)(ii)-(iii). 
140. 289 Md. 620, 426 A.2d 908 (1981). 
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statute, which simply required the Secretary of Health and Mental 
Hygiene to "administer a program of comprehensive medical and 
other care in the State for indigent and medically indigent persons, "141 
authorized the appropriation of public funds for abortions.142 
The appellants, a group of residents and taxpayers seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent state funding of abor-
tions,143 argued first that the term "comprehensive medical and other 
care" could not be read to include "nontherapeutic abortions." 144 
Second, the appellants argued that at the time of the enactment of 
the statute nearly all abortions were illegal. 145 
The court of appeals in Kindley found no merit in either of the 
appellants' arguments. The court held that since the statute was 
phrased in broad and general terms, the statute was "designed to 
permit indigent persons to receive the advantages of whatever health 
care may be presently accepted as appropriate in the medical com-
munity. "146 The court found that the statute was enacted to "alleviate 
some of the hardships of poverty by providing medical care to those 
who could not afford it, "147 and that "an abortion is certainly one 
of the medical alternatives for dealing with pregnancy. "148 The court 
of appeals went on to point out that even in light of Harris v. 
McRae, federal and state governments were still free to fund abor-
tions, including nontherapeutic abortions. 149 However, the court clearly 
indicated that nothing in the decision suggested that the State of 
Maryland was constitutionally required to fund any abortions. 150 
The Kindley decision indicates that the court of appeals would 
not be willing to read a "comprehensive medical" statute to exclude 
abortion funding for indigent women. The decision also indicates 
that the court of appeals would prefer that the General Assembly 
legislate on the controversial issue of abortion rather than the court 
141. MD. CODE ANN. art. 43, § 42(a)(l) (1980). 
142. Kindley, 289 Md. at 623, 426 A.2d at 910. 
143. [d. at 622, 426 A.2d at 910. 
144. !d. at 623, 426 A.2d at 911. 
145. [d. at 624, 426 A.2d at 911 ("At the time of the 1967 amendments to § 42, 
any abortion, even by a licensed physician, was a criminal offense, except 
where the fetus was dead or the physician, after consultation with one or more 
physicians, was 'satisfied ... that no other method [would] secure the safety 
of the mother.' ") 
146. [d. The Kindley court added: "Where, as here, a statute is phrased in broad 
general terms, it suggests that the legislature intended the provision to be 
capable of encompassing circumstances and situations which did not exist at 
the time of the enactment." [d. at 625, 426 A.2d at 911. 
147. [d. at 626, 426 A.2d at 912. 
148. [d. at 628, 426 A.2d at 913. 
149. [d. at 629, 426 A.2d at 914. 
150. [d. at 630, 426 A.2d at 914 ("the General Assembly is free to limit the condi-
tions under which public funds may be expended for abortions"). 
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having to decide whether the Maryland Constitution contains rights 
relating to abortion. The General Assembly has done just that in the 
most recent legislative session. Now, regardless of whether the Su-
preme Court overrules Roe in a future case, the holding of Roe will 
be the law in Maryland unless or until the General Assembly decides 
otherwise. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services indicates that Roe v. Wade may be either overruled or 
further substantially modified in the very near future. State courts 
and legislative bodies have responded to the Supreme Court's holdings 
in Harris v. McRae and Webster in various ways. Some states have 
held that indigent women have the right under their state constitution 
to receive funds for an abortion. Other states have held that their 
state constitutions provide no such guarantees. In some states, most 
recently in Florida, the courts have determined that under their state 
constitution, a woman has the right to determine whether to terminate 
or carry a pregnancy to term. In other states, such as Maryland, the 
state's legislative branch has statutorily established a woman's right 
to choose. Though the state courts and legislative bodies have varied 
greatly in their holdings and statutes, one thing remains clear-if 
Roe is overruled, the state legislative and judicial battles are bound 
to intensify. 
